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Quota Trading and Profitability: 
Theoretical Models and Applications to Danish Fisheries 
 
Abstract 
Using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we provide a framework to analyze the potential 
gains from quota trading. We compare the industry profit and structure before and after a free 
trade reallocation of production quotas. The effects of tradable production quotas depend on 
several technological and behavioral characteristics, including the ability to learn best 
practice (catch-up) and the ability to change the input and output composition (mix). To 
illustrate the usefulness of our approach, we analyze a dataset from the Danish fishery. We 
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Quota Trading and Profitability: 
Theoretical Models and Applications to Danish Fisheries 
 
Introduction 
In theory as well as in practice,  individual transferable (production) rights are useful to 
ensure optimal allocation of production. Popular applications are found within environmental 
and resource economics, where the usage of a r esource by one agent implies negative 
externalities on the other agents. Pioneering work includes Crocker and Dales, and 
Montgomery gives an early mathematical presentation. In a traditional externality 
interpretation, the regulator distributes the property right to the good causing the externality 
among the users of this good. Thereafter they are restricted from using more of the good than 
they own, but they are allowed to sell and buy these rights.  
 
The fishery is one of the economic sectors, where regulators in many countries use individual 
transferable rights. Applications are found in for example United States, New Zealand, 
Canada, Iceland and the Netherlands. Furthermore, several countries, including Denmark, are 
considering to use this instrument. In fisheries, the individual rights are quotas that define 
initial allowances to catch a certain amount of fish. In the literature, the rights are therefore 
referred to as Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ). 
 
Any change in the regulatory framework is costly. Introducing ITQ requires that the regulator 
and the industry learn about and adapt to the new regime. Before moving from an incumbent 
regime to one based on ITQs, it is therefore important to estimate the likely gains from the 
resulting reallocation of the production. The potential gains (in a comparative static sense) 
should exceed the transition costs.    4 
This paper discusses different ways to model the reallocation of production following the 
introduction of ITQs. It uses these models to estimate the likely  gains and structural 
implications from introducing ITQs in the Danish fishery. The potential gains from ITQs are 
estimated by comparing the profit under the current system of catch allocation with the profit 
under the optimal allocation of catches. We presume that the optimal allocation will 
eventually be realized, if we introduce free quota trade. 
 
Part of the challenge is that the available production data and behavioral patterns are the 
result of the incumbent regime. The technological adaptation and behavioral responses are 
therefore somewhat uncertain. We suggest several alternatives – varying in the extent to 
which individual fishermen can improve performance and change their catch mix - and use 
these to estimate a range of likely impacts. 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is useful to model the underlying production structure in a 
reallocation study. DEA is essentially an activity analysis approach, where actual productions 
are used as activities. DEA estimates a production frontier from the best practices of the 
analyzed Decision Making Units (DMU). This frontier can be used to evaluate possible gains 
from individual learning (catching up) as well as from reallocations among the DMUs. 
Moreover, by its reliance on Linear Programming, it is easy to formulate alternative research 
questions and to get numerical estimates from large datasets, as we shall demonstrate below. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows: The next section reviews some related literature. A 
brief introduction to DEA is given in third section. The fourth section discusses the 
theoretical framework and the ways in which reallocations can give rise to gains in general 
terms. The specific sectoral models are presented in the fifth section. In the sixth section, the   5 
usage of the framework is demonstrated on a dataset from Danish fisheries. The final section 
concludes the paper. 
 
Related Literature 
There is a large micro-economic literature on the usage of tradable production rights. We 
shall not cover this here. Rather, we focus on the relatively few papers using DEA to estimate 
reallocation gains in a manner somewhat similar to our approach. Also, we briefly relate our 
approach to the usage of (Positive) Mathematical Programming to predict sectoral 
developments in agriculture and to the  iterative multilevel planning problems found in 
divisionalized firms and planned economies.  
 
Brännlund, Färe, and Grosskopf and Brännlund, Chung, Färe, and Grosskopf study the 
Swedish pulp and paper industry using a DEA model with some non-discretionary inputs and 
some unwanted outputs. They use this model to estimate the cost of the existing transmission 
constraints at the individual units and the gains from reallocation.  
 
A related approach is used in Bogetoft and Wang and Bogetoft, Strange, and Thorsen. In 
these papers, the potential gains from mergers of consultancy units in the agricultural and 
forestry industries, respectively, are estimated. The reallocations are restricted to take place 
among geographical neighbors. Moreover, the gains are decomposed in learning, mix and 
size effects, and the corresponding organizational changes are identified. 
 
An attractive feature of these studies is the direct investigation of reallocations and the 
associated matching problems. The rights and obligations of the individuals are reallocated in 
a balanced manner to preserve the sectorwide rights and obligations. This requires the   6 
solution of non-trivial matching problems, since a multiplicity of inputs and outputs in the 
production process must be accounted for. 
 
Also, the explicit formulation of the matching problems is in sharp contrast to the simpler, 
more naive but widely used production economic approach of measuring allocative 
efficiency. Allocative efficiency is typically defined as cost efficiency divided by  technical 
efficiency. It therefore measures what can be gained by adapting to given prices in a complete 
and perfect market and it effectively ignores the matching issues in a finite economy. 
  
A potential drawback of these studies, however, is that they all assume that the reallocation 
takes place at the frontier. This means that all units are assumed to adapt to the best practice 
before the reallocation. Although competition may work to drive out inefficient firms, it may 
be naive to presume technical efficiency up front. After all, efficiency studies of most sectors, 
including very competitive ones, have revealed that inefficiency is a persistent phenomenon. 
Also, even from a theoretical perspective, technical inefficiency may be a rational response as 
it may help compensate the employees, facilitate rent seeking behavior or improve the result 
of strategic interactions with other firms on the market place, cf. Bogetoft and Hougaard. 
 
The fact that reallocation and individual efficiency improvement may not go hand in hand 
was first suggested in Bogetoft and Färe. There, we discuss how to measure allocative 
efficiency without presuming technical efficiency. Also, we compare the “new approach” 
with the “traditional approach” of assuming technical efficiency before measuring allocative 
efficiency. In particular, we develop necessary and sufficient conditions on the technology to 
ensure consistency between the new and the traditional measures. 
   7 
In this paper, we extend the traditional approach to allocative efficiency in DEA models by 1) 
working with genuine and direct reallocation estimates that take into account matching 
problems and sector wide restrictions and by 2) dispensing with the assumption of technical 
efficiency when the gains from reallocations are examined. Moreover, we 3) estimate the 
differences in an actual large-scale application. 
 
It is worthwhile also to relate our approach to the traditional use of mathematical 
programming in sector models. There is a large literature on such usages of mathematical 
programming in agriculture, cf. e.g. Hazell and Norton. There is also a recent revival of this 
literature known as positive mathematical programming, cf. Howitt, where the calibration to 
the real world outcome is done using non-linear objectives to avoid “jumpy” behavior.  
 
In the sector models using mathematical programming, the individual firms may be more or 
less efficient. It basically depends on the activities we use to model their possibilities. Also, 
genuine reallocation problems may be studied. In this sense, the approach of this paper is 
certainly in line with the traditional mathematical programming approach to sector models. 
The way we deviate is primarily by working with a large number of firm types, one for each 
firm in the sector, and by m odeling the individual firms based on an initial DEA based 
efficiency analysis. 
 
Another line of literature that share many similarities with the present usage of mathematical 
programming to study reallocations, is the so-called iterative, multilevel planning literature, 
cf. Dirickx and Jennergren, Johansen (1977, 1978), Meijboom, and Obel. The focus of this 
literature has been the coordination problem in a divisionalized firm or planned economy.  
   8 
An example involves a headquarters facing the problem of allocating resources among 
divisions so as to maximize overall profit. The headquarters lacks information about the 
profit functions of the divisions, i.e. about how the contributions of the divisions depend on 
allocated resources. Hence, it pays to acquire further information. Full disclosure is typically 
impossible or prohibitively costly, and iterative planning procedures are therefore considered. 
In such a procedure, the headquarters asks a sequence of questions about the values of or 
needs for resources, and hereby gradually learns about the profit functions of the divisions. At 
some point, the procedure stops and an allocation is chosen. This line of research has been 
concerned with the design of procedures that exhibit certain desirable properties like 
convergence, feasibility, monotonicity, and efficient use of information.  
 
The sector and multilevel models share two important properties with the present paper: 1) 
they solve genuine reallocation problems and 2) the individual firms or divisions may, 
depending on the way they are modeled, be more or less technically efficient. In this sense, 
there are important similarities. Moreover, the multilevel literature studies the transition path 
from an incumbent allocation to a new allocation – and not just the resulting reallocation in a 
comparative static outcome. In this sense, it extends the previous and present approaches and 
could be an interesting dynamic supplement to the approach of this paper. 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis 
In this section, we provide an i ntroduction to the main ideas and constructs in Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA is a relatively simple approach to derive the relative 
efficiency of production units using linear programming. DEA was first introduced in the late 
seventies by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978, 1979). Subsequently, more than a thousand 
scientific papers have elaborated upon and applied DEA to almost every sector of the   9 
economy




Consider the case where each of V Decision Making Units (DMUs), v ˛I={1,…,V}, 














v ) y ,..., y ( y ￿ ˛ =  the outputs produced in DMU
v, v˛I. Also, let T be the underlying 
production possibility set: 
  T = {(x,y)˛
M N
0
+ ￿ | x can produce y}  (1) 
Some regularity assumptions are usually imposed on T. The classical assumptions are that for 
all x', x'' 
N
0 ￿ ˛  and y', y''
M
0 ￿ ˛ , we have: 
A1 disposability:  (x',y')˛T and x'' ‡ x' and y'' £ y' ￿ (x'',y'')˛T  
A2 convexity:    T convex 
A3 s-return to scale:  (x', y') ˛T ￿ k(x', y')˛T for k˛K(s) 
 
where s corresponds to either constant (crs), decreasing (drs) or variable (vrs) return to scale, 
and where K(crs) = ￿0, K(drs) = [0,1], and K(vrs) = {1}, respectively.  
 
For a given technology, (in)efficiency is the ability to reduce inputs without affecting outputs 
or to increase outputs without requiring more inputs. In the case of multiple inputs and 
                                                 
1 See for instance www.deazone.dk for an updated bibliography. Alternatively, Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt, 
Charnes, Cooper, Levin, and Seiford give examples of Data Envelopment Analysis applications to different 
sectors. 
2 For textbook introductions to DEA, see Charnes, Cooper, Lewin, and Seiford; Coelli, Rao, and Battese or 
Cooper, Seiford, and Tone.   10 
outputs, the efficiency of a DMU, say DMU
v, is often measured by the so-called Farrell 
(1957) efficiency measures: 
  E
v = Min {E˛￿0 Œ(Ex
v , y
v)˛T}     (2) 
or 
  F
v = Max {F˛￿0 ￿(x
v , Fy
v )˛T}  (3) 
where E
v is the maximal radial contraction of all inputs and F
v is the maximal radial 
expansion of all outputs that are feasible for DMU
v in T. Note that 1-E
v is a measure of the 
(proportion of) inputs wasted on non-productive purposes. DMU
v uses x
v, but in fact E
vx
v 
would be sufficient. Similarly, F
v-1 is a measure of the proportional waste of output. DMU
v is 
only producing y




In many applications, the underlying production possibility set T is unknown. The DEA 
















v ) y ,..., y ( y ￿ ˛ =  are the outputs actually produced by DMU
v, v˛I. The DEA approach 
estimates T from the observed data points and evaluates the observed productions relative to 
the estimated technology. 
 
The estimate of T, denoted as the  empirical reference technology  T*, is constructed 
according to the minimal extrapolation principle. T* is the smallest subset of 
M N
0
+ ￿  that 
contains (envelop) the actual production plans (x
v,y
v), v˛I, and satisfies certain technological 
assumptions specific to the given approach.   11 
The (relative) efficiency of DMU
v may then be measured in input or output space by using 
the Farrell measures above, with T* substituted for T. 
 
Different DEA models invoke different assumptions about the technology. Charnes, Cooper 
and Rhodes (1978, 1979) proposed the original constant returns to scale (crs) DEA model 
assuming A1, A2 and A3(crs). Banker developed the decreasing returns to scale (drs) model, 
while Banker, Charnes and Cooper outlined the (local) variable returns to scale (vrs) model 
using A1, A2 and A3(drs) and A1, A2 and A3(vrs), respectively. It is straightforward to see, 
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where L(s) equals either L(crs) = 
V
0 ￿ , L(drs) = {l˛
V
0 ￿ | ￿v l
v £ 1} or L(vrs) = {l˛
V
0 ￿ |￿v 
l
v = 1}. Since these are polyhedral convex sets, the Farrell efficiency programs become 
linear programming problems.    
 
The three classical assumptions A1-A3 have been relaxed in several respects. Deprins, Simar, 
and Tulkens proposed the free disposability hull (fdh) model, which invokes only A1. The 
structure of T*(fdh) therefore has the structure above with L(fdh) = {l˛
V
0 ￿ |￿v l
v = 1, l
v 
˛{0, 1} "v}. The free replicability hull (frh) model was briefly proposed in Tulkens. The 
free replicability hull model invokes A1 and an additivity assumption A4: (x',y')˛T and 
(x'',y'')˛T ￿ (x'+x'', y'+y'')˛T, giving T*(frh) the structure above with L(frh) = {l˛
V
0 ￿ | l
v 
˛{0,1,2,3…}  "v}. Partial relaxation of the convexity assumption A2 in DEA models is 
suggested in Petersen and examined by Bogetoft. 
   12 
It should be noted that DEA b y construction provides an inner approximation of the 
underlying production possibility set. The efficiency estimates can therefore be over 
optimistic and the potential input savings and output expansions thus underestimated. 
 
The effects of reallocations 
The effects of allowing reallocations within an industry depend on the reactions of the firms. 
In this section, we first develop a general framework to model the likely reactions and to 
measure the expected effects. Next, we discuss in more details some important extreme cases 
that we have implemented in the empirical section. 
 
The first crucial question is what can and what cannot be reallocated? To capture this we 
assume that inputs and outputs can be sub-divided into standard (S) goods, i.e. goods that can 
be acquired and sold at perfect markets, regulated (R) goods, i.e. goods than in principle 
could be transferred, but which are at present regulated, and  fixed (F) goods, i.e. non-
discretionary goods which must be used and produced locally. In the case of fisheries, fuel is 
a typical standard good, quota a typical regulated but potentially transferable good, and fixed 
costs a typical non-discretionary good in the short run. Let the inputs and outputs of DMU
v 
be split up according to this classification: 













v v =   (5) 
where 
v
S x , 
v
R x , 
v
F x , 
v
S y , 
v
R y and 
v
F y  are NS-, NR-, NF-, MS-, MR-, and MF-dimensional sub-
vectors with NS + NR + NF = N and MS + MR + MF = M. In a study of the likely consequences 
of introducing reallocation, the S goods are those that can be reallocated in the incumbent 
regime, while the S and R goods are those that can be reallocated in the new regime. 
   13 
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where p is the price vector for standard outputs and w is the price vector for standard inputs.  
 
With the present regime and the observed i nputs and outputs, (x
obs v ,y
obs v ), v=1,…,V, 
therefore, observed industry profit is: 
  ( ) [ ] ￿ ￿
= =









v obs v obs obs wx py y , x   (7) 
Technical efficiency with non-discretionary variables can be measured as above, except that 
there is no contraction or expansion in the non-discretionary dimensions, cf. Golany and Roll 
and Charnes, Cooper, Levin and Seiford. Therefore, the observed efficiency of DMU
v can be 
calculated as: 
  E







v obs y )˛T}  (8) 
or 
  F
obs v = Max {F˛￿0 ￿(






F y )˛T}  (9) 
If we now allow the regulated goods to be transferred, the new industry profit will be: 
  ( ) [ ] ￿ ￿
= =









v v new wx py y , x   (10) 
where (x
v,y
v), v=1,…,V, are the inputs and outputs in the new regime with transferable, 
regulated goods. The difference ?
new-?
obs thus measures the effects of reallocation. 
 
To calculate the new industry profits and hereby the gains from allowing reallocation, we 
must predict how the firms will react to the allowed reallocation and thus what the new inputs   14 
and outputs of the firms will be. To model this, we assume very generally that the new 
outcome is determined by solving the following reallocation problem: 
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v ˛   v = 1,…,V  (11.a) 
       
  v obs v E E 1 ‡ ‡   v = 1,…,V  (11.b) 












R x x     (11.c) 












R y y     (11.d) 
where G is a penalty function. In this program, we have used  ) E , y , y , x , x ( R S R S  to briefly 
refer to the standard and regulated inputs and outputs and the efficiency levels of all the units. 
That is, we stick to the convention of referring to a variable from all the vessels by 
suppressing the specific vessel numbers v.  
  
The interpretation of this program is that it determines reallocated standard and regulated 
goods and changed efficiency levels,  ) E , y , y , x , x ( R S R S , so as to maximize profit and 
minimize the penalty G. The idea of the penalty function G is that it increases with growing 








S  allocations 
and efficiency levels. It can therefore be interpreted in two ways. One can think of it as a 
technical way to calibrate the model in line with the positive mathematical programming 
tradition. Conversely, one can think of it as reflecting the costs of changing behavior from 
one regime to another. The more the new allocations and efficiency levels deviate from the 
presently observed ones, the more complicated the transition. 
   15 
The constraints in the reallocation problem reflect that the reallocated goods must lead to 
feasible production plans under the assumed improvements in efficiency levels. Moreover, 
the reallocations must be balanced in the sense that the industry at large cannot use more of 
the regulated inputs nor reduce the regulated outputs. 
 
In the reallocation problem above we assumed that improvements in the technical efficiency 
would work on the input side, in the sense that the proportional (Farrell type) waste of 
(discretionary) inputs (1-E) will be reduced. Alternatively, one could assume that the 
technical efficiency improvements work on the output side and lead to a reduction in the 
waste (F-1) of discretionary outputs. This will result in the following reallocation problem:  
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R y y     (12.d) 
In the next section, we solve a series of problems like the above. The problems correspond to 
different and rather extreme specifications of the penalty function G as indicator functions. 
The penalty is either zero or infinite, i.e. we only look at changes in allocations and efficiency 
levels that are either costless to introduce or impossible to undertake. The motives for the 
cases we consider is that some important determinants of the reactions to an ITQ system in 
the case of fisheries will be 
 
•  The extent to which the level of technical efficiency can be changed 
•  The extent to which the output mix can be changed   16 
Numerous articles have investigated the  level of technical efficiency for fishing vessels, 
including which factors influence this level and how it can be improved
3. It is difficult to 
determine a priori whether a change in regulation system will give rise to a change in the 
level of technical efficiency. As a start, it is therefore useful to examine the two extreme 
situations, where changes in efficiency are either prohibitively costly or entirely costless, i.e. 
where efficiency can either not be changed or be changed entirely free. 
 
The output mix chosen by a fisherman is influenced by many factors, including the costs of 
changing the mix and the regulatory possibilities. With respect to costs, some vessels may be 
able to change their output mix without significant costs, while these may be large for others. 
The level of costs depends upon factors such as type of fishery conducted (pelagic, demersal 
or benthic), flexibility to re-rig, experience of the fisherman, etc. Of course the mix will also 
depend on possible regulatory constraints imposed alongside the quota system. The exact 
formulation of the quota system (which catches can be exchanged for example), and the way 
a possible market for reallocating quotas is set up (how often is it possible to reallocate for 
example) will be important. Again we consider only two extremes below, viz. the case of no 
mix restrictions and the case of fixed mixes such that a fisherman can only scale his 
operations up and down without altering the mix. 
 
Our applied framework thus consists of four models defined by the allowed technological and 
behavioral changes. The models including their acronyms are summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
                                                 
3 See for instance Kirkley, Squires and Strand; Sharma and Leung and Pascoe, Andersen and de Wilde.   17 
Table 1 Sector models and their acronyms 




Level of technical efficiency fixed (EF)  Model EF-MF  Model EF-MC 
Level of technical efficiency changeable (EC)  Model EC-MF  Model EC-MC 
 
The fisherman’s ability to change behavior is thus most restricted in Model EF-MF and least 
restricted in Model EC-MC. The lowest trade gains are therefore expected in the former and 
the highest in the latter
4. The two other models are intermediate and their profits cannot be 
ranked internally. 
 
We conclude this section by discussing how the reallocation in the different cases can 
generate improved profits. Three important effects can be identified, i.e. efficiency effects, 
scale effects and mix effects, respectively. Table 2 below illustrates which of these effects are 
effective in each of the four models. 
 
Table 2 Reallocation effects 
  Efficiency effects  Scale effects  Mix effects 
Model EF-MF  X  X   
Model EC-MF    X   
Model EF-MC  X  X  X 
Model EC-MC    X  X 
 
The efficiencies of the individual vessels play a role, when they cannot be changed. In such 
cases, reallocating quota from less efficient to more efficient vessels can generate trade gains. 
The scale of operations will also be important. If the underlying technology is a variable 
return to scale technology, it will in general be beneficial to move the vessels closer to the so-
called most productive scale size (cf. B anker), where the output per input is maximal. This 
suggests that gains can be generated by giving more quotas to small units operating under 
                                                 
4 The partial ranking follows from the principle sometimes referred to as Le Châtelier Principle (cf. Samuelson). 
It states that gains cannot increase, when an extra restriction is imposed.   18 
increasing return to scale and by taking quota from larger units working above optimal scale 
size. Finally, if the mix of inputs and outputs can be changed, this can generate improved 
industry profits. By the convexity of the technology, it always pays to have non-specialized 
or non-extreme compositions. The mix effect refers to the tradability gains arising from 
vessels changing their output mix towards a more productive direction of the product space. 
This effect is therefore only observed in the model where the output mix can be changed. For 
an extended discussion of efficiency, size and mix gains, see Bogetoft and Wang. 
 
Four sectoral models  
The mathematical representations of the model to calculate individual technical efficiencies 
and the four sectoral models to calculate industry profits under various technological and 
behavioral assumptions are given in this section. We assume in each model that the 
production technology is characterized by variable returns to scale on a yearly basis
5.  
 
Using the output-oriented approach described in Section 3, the technical efficiency F of each 
vessel v' can be calculated by solving the following technical efficiency program (c.f. Färe, 
Grosskopf, and Lovell): 
                                                 
5 The sectoral models have also been formulated under the assumption of variable returns to scale on a daily 
basis, but these are not presented here. Further information can be obtained from the authors.   19 
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v ' v 1, 0
v ' v ‡ l   v = 1,…,V  (13.d) 
where CPY is the catch per year in weight, VCPY is the variable (discretionary) costs per 
year,  FCPY is the fixed (non-discretionary) costs per year, and ? is the intensity variable. As 
previously, the subscripts are respectively related to the output number (m) and the input 
number (n) and the superscript obs indicates that the observed values have been used. We use 
this notation in the forthcoming models as well. 
 
The level of technical efficiency is thus maximized under four individual restrictions for each 
vessel. The restrictions secure that the analyzed vessel is within the production possibility as 
estimated by minimal extrapolation from the observed vessels. 
  
Turning attention to the sector problems, each programming problem includes an objective 
function and a series of restrictions. The objective is to maximize industry profits. The 
restrictions relate both to the individual vessels and to the entire industry, and they ensure that 
the reallocated productions are technically feasible. 
   20 
Given the estimated levels of technical efficiency  F
obs for each vessel, the industry 
programming problem related to Model EF-MF can be formulated as follows: 
￿ ￿ ￿
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(14.a,b,c,d) repeated for each v' = 1,…,V 
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  m = 1,…,M  (14.e) 
where ß is the output expansion variable, and P is the vector of output prices. 
 
Short run industry profits are thus maximized under four individual restrictions for each 
vessel and one overall industry restriction for each output. The first four restrictions ensure 
that the new cost-catch profile for each vessel is within the production possibility set 
estimated from all the vessels. The first restriction allows the output level, but not the output 
mix, to be changed via modifications in the parameter ß. The second restriction tracks the 
corresponding changes in the variable costs. The changes in output and variable costs are 
however restricted by the presence of fixed costs as described in the third restriction. Finally, 
the total output of the industry, i.e. catch being the regulated good, is restricted by the last 
restriction to be equal or below the total observed output in the dataset. The profit 
improvements are therefore not generated by exploiting the natural resources more heavily,   21 
but come from the way the vessels allocate the use of the fish resources among each other. 
This unchanged utilization of the resource is also imposed in the subsequent programs. In 
more advanced applications, this could of course be changed and in particular, one could use 
the above program to determine the costs of the overall utilization constraints. 
 
By including the level of technical efficiency for each vessel in the industry profit function 
and the industry output restriction, the gains are generated without any improvements in the 
individual efficiencies. The idea is that a vessel with an individual score of say 1.25 will 
always catch only a fraction (1/1.25=0.8) of his potential output. 
 
If vessels are allowed to change their level of technical efficiency, i.e. become technically 
efficient, the industry problem denoted Model EC-MF becomes: 
￿ ￿ ￿
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Compared to Model EF-MF, all vessels are assumed to produce on the frontier. This implies 
that previously non-efficient vessels become more relevant to consider when maximizing 
industry profits. 
 
Instead of allowing the level of technical efficiency to change, it can be assumed that vessels 
can change their output mix, i.e. catch composition. The consequences of such an assumption 
can be analyzed by solving the industry program labeled Model EF -MC: 
￿ ￿ ￿
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In the least restrictive model, it is assumed that the level of technical efficiency and the 
output mix can be changed. The industry problem related to this situation is denoted Model 
EC-MC and becomes: 
￿ ￿ ￿
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Four industry models with different assumptions about production technology and behavior 
have thus been formulated. Depending on the number of observations in the analyzed dataset, 
the number of equations in each model is equal to V ·(M+N+1) + M and can therefore be 
substantial.  
 
By varying the assumptions about the flexibility, managers can by estimating these models 
obtain further insight into the possible gains, when going from one management system to an 
individual quota system. The expected gains rise with increased flexibility, with respect to 
behavior and technology.  
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An application to Danish fisheries 
In this section, we illustrate the framework above by estimating the potential gains from 
implementing an individual quota system in Danish fishery. 
 
A dataset from 2001 covering 288 Danish fishing vessels is utilized
6. Extensive economic 
information is available on these vessels, because they are used to develop the yearly account 




The vessels in the dataset differ from each other in several respects. Most notably, the vessels 
vary from netters and Danish seiners to trawlers and purse seiners. This variation in types 
affects the catch  and cost composition of the vessels. Larger trawlers, for example, are 
specialized to catch low-priced industrial species (sandeel, sprat etc.), Danish seiners, beam 
trawlers and netters catch higher priced consumption species (cod, plaice, herring etc.), while 
other vessels, for instance medium sized trawlers, catch both types of fish depending on the 
season. 
 
In the reallocation study, we have aggregated the number of outputs
8 to nine output groups 
defined as: 1) cod, 2) other codfish, 3) plaice, 4) other flatfish, 5) herring, 6) mackerel, 7) 
lobster and shrimps, 8) other consumption species and 9) industrial species. All costs in the 
                                                 
6 A fictitious observation is also included in the dataset with zero catches and costs in order to facilitate vessels 
to reduce their catches and costs to zero, i.e. lay-up. The actual number of observations is therefore 289. 
7 The statistics only cover the commercial part of the Danish fishing fleet, i.e. vessels with a total catch value 
above 219,202 DKK (»21,225US$) in 2001.  
8 The original dataset included 45 species.   25 
dataset have likewise been categorized as either variable or fixed, and thereafter combined 
into four types of variable costs and two types of fixed costs, respectively. Variable costs are 
thus considered to be expenses for: 1) fuel and lubricants, 2) ice and provisions, 3) sale and 4) 
crew, while fixed costs are divided between costs for: 1) maintenance and 2) insurance and 
different services. 
 
It is assumed that the allocation of catches observed in the dataset corresponds to a feasible 
allocation under the management system in 2001. The following analysis therefore reflects 
the gains that could be realized, if the 2001 catches were allocated optimally among the 
vessels. As above, we have made different assumptions about the production technology. 
Each model has been programmed and solved in the optimization software General Algebraic 
Modeling System GAMS (Brooke, Kendrick, Meeraus, and Raman)
9. 
 
Firstly, we estimate the level of technical efficiency for each vessel by solving the technical 
efficiency program. Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics for the estimated scores.  
 
Table 3 Output-orientated technical efficiency scores  
  Mean value  Standard deviation  Maximum value 
F  1.22  0.38  3.45 
 
Interpretation of the results in Table 3 indicates that the vessels can increase their output by 
approximately 20% on average without increasing costs. For some vessels, the increase in 
output can even be more than three times their present output. The number of 100% 
technically efficient vessels is estimated to be 143. However, there seems to be a tendency for 
sample size bias in the estimates as illustrated in Figure 1. The plots of technical efficiency 
                                                 
9 Each industry model consisted of 4,923 equations, and took around 15 minutes to solve on a Pentium IV (2.4 
GHz) processor.   26 
against the total costs suggests that larger vessels may be categorized as technically efficient 
simply because there is a low number of these vessels. 
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With this in mind, we n ow analyze the expected gains and the consequences on the fleet 
structure from introducing a quota market. Table 4 shows the increase in short run profits or 
earnings, i.e. catch value minus variable cost. Exclusively reallocating catches without 
changing  the level of technical efficiency and output mix, Model EF-MF estimates that 
earnings can be increased by 27%. Relaxing each of these assumptions separately implies that 
earnings can be increased by 38% compared to the earnings in the current regulation system. 
Thus, despite the obvious differences between allowing mix or efficiency changes, they 
approximately give rise to the same change in earnings. In the situation with the most flexible 
production technology, earnings are predicted to increase by 45%, corresponding to 223 
million DKK (»32 million US$). 
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Table 4 Earnings  
  Earnings (1,000 DKK)  Change compared to initial earnings (%) 
Initial   494,447   
Model EF-MF  628,582  27.13 
Model EC-MF  683,065  38.15 
Model EF-MC  685,563  38.65 
Model EC-MC  720,515  45.72 
 
If we deduct fixed costs from earnings we get gross profits, i.e. how much is left as rent on 
the invested capital and any extra payment to the vessel owner. The same pattern can be 
observed for gross profits as for earnings, cf. Table 5, although the relative changes are 
higher. In the most flexible situation given by Model EC-MC, gross profits are estimated to 
increase by 87%, and are thus almost twice as high as in the initial situation.  
 
Table 5 Gross profits  
  Gross profits (1,000 DKK)  Change compared to initial gross profits (%) 
Initial   260,270   
Model EF-MF  394,404  51.54 
Model EC-MF  451,386  73.43 
Model EF-MC  448,888  72.47 
Model EC-MC  486,338  86.86 
 
For both earnings and gross profits, we observe that over 50% of the gains expected in the 
most flexible model arises from simply reallocating quotas without allowing technological or 
behavioral changes. The increases in earnings and gross profits can primarily be related to the 
fact that catches are reallocated to vessels with lower variable costs, cf. Table 6. Only minor 
variation in the catch value is observed, as one would expect from the imposed industry 
restrictions on total catch
10. Total variable cost is reduced by 30% from an initial level of 752 
million DKK to 526 million DKK in the most flexible model, i.e. Model EC-MC. 
                                                 
10 Reallocation of catches between different vessel types does not alter the catch value, because the price of each 
species is assumed to be the same for all vessels. This may be an over-simplistic assumption, but is considered 
acceptable for current illustration purposes.   28 
Table 6 Catch values and variable costs 
  Catch value (1,000 DKK)  Variable costs (1,000 DKK) 
Initial   1,246,760  752,313 
Model EF-MF  1,233,210  604,629 
Model EC-MF  1,241,803  556,240 
Model EF-MC  1,246,760  563,695 
Model EC-MC  1,246,760  526,245 
 
The gains from implementing a system of ITQs would most likely be higher in a long run 
specification. In the short run, vessels without activity still have to defray the fixed costs, and 
can therefore only lay-up. In the long run, vessels would be able to decommission, and 
therefore do not have to pay the fixed costs. 
 
To get an idea of the quota market necessary to support the new allocations, it is interesting to 
look at the predicted trade patterns. Table 7 depicts the number of vessels that are net-buyers 
and net-sellers of quota, the total traded amount and the number of vessels ending up with 
zero catch. A vessel can - on the disaggregate level be - both a buyer and a seller, but here we 
only focus on the aggregate, net effects. 
 
Table 7 Activity on the quota market 













Model EF-MF  124  124  40  112,520  24 
Model EC-MF  146  111  31  116,250  14 
Model EF-MC  119  169  0  729,066  25 
Model EC-MC  98  190  0  841,178  0 
 
We observe an interesting development, when allowing the output mix to change. First of all, 
every vessel becomes active on the market, i.e. there are no status quo vessels. Also, the 
number of selling vessels is higher than the number of buying vessels. This could indicate a 
possible tendency towards concentration on the market, a topic that we will return to in detail 
later. Last but not least, the possibility to change mix has a dramatic impact on the trade   29 
volume. In the two models with output mix fixed, the traded amounts are around 115,000 
tonnes, no matter whether technical efficiency is fixed or changeable. Allowing vessels to 
rearrange their catch composition leads to a factor increase of 6-7 in the trade volume. One 
interpretation of this is that the economies of scope are very important.  
 
To explore the structural implications and concentration further and the scope effects in 
particular we have calculated the angle between the output composition of each individual 
vessel in the dataset and the average vessel in the dataset
11. 
 
Table 8 Output composition angles (degrees) 
  Initial  Model EF-MF  Model EC-MF  Model EF-MC  Model EC-MC 
Average angle  52.52 52.44 52.11 42.29 45.64
 
As seen in Table 8, the initial average angle is approximately 52 degrees for the two models 
with fixed output mix. This is as expected, because the average vessel is only marginally 
changed. However, allowing the output mix to change results in a significant reduction in the 
average angle to 42 and 46 degrees, respectively. This can naturally be understood as an 
exploration of the economies of scope. In a convex production technology like the one 
modeled by DEA, there are no gains from specialization in the mix, cf. also Bogetoft and 
Wang for an extended discussion. 
 
                                                 
11 The angles have been calculated using  ( ) b a b a ) ( Cos b , a
r r r r ￿ ￿ = q , where a and b refer to the output vector of 
the a nalyzed vessel and theaverage vessel in the dataset, respectively, and b , a q  is the angle between them. To 
reflect the relative importance of the vessels, the average angle is a weighted average using  a r as weight. 
Observe that in multiple dimensions, the average angles can be quite high in the positive orthant. For example, 
the angle between (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1) and (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) is 70 degrees. 
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The tendency for vessels to adjust their size towards the average vessel is also supported by 
the figures in Table 9. We see that the average catch weight per vessel is approximately 
unchanged, while the standard deviation and maximum catch weight decrease.  
 
Table 9 Catch weight (tonnes) 
  Average  Standard deviation  Maximum  Minimum 
Initial  2,157 3,996 21,959 9
Model EF-MF  2,154 4,100 21,959 0
Model EC-MF  2,156 3,992 21,959 0
Model EF-MC  2,157 3,922 20,623 0
Model EC-MC  2,157 2,998 17,662 11
 
Conclusions 
The use of individual transferable quotas is an interesting instrument in the regulator’s 
toolbox. However, before putting it to work, it is valuable to estimate the potential economic 
gains that can be obtained. After all, changing a current regulatory system to one based upon 
ITQs will introduce new transaction costs and it may take time before the comparative static 
effects are realized. 
 
In this paper, we have suggested a framework to estimate the gains that can be expected from 
implementing an ITQ system. We developed the framework in general terms, making it 
applicable to any economic sector and any modeling of the production technology. Moreover, 
we briefly introduced Data Envelopment Analysis and showed how this can be used as one 
way to operationalize the gains. In the framework, we allowed for different behavioral and 
technological assumptions regarding the ability to learn best practice and change the output 
mix. The reasons for reallocation can in these models be related to efficiency, scale and mix 
effects. 
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Based on the general framework, we have developed four sectoral models to capture the 
gains from introducing ITQs in fisheries. These models all seek to maximize profits under 
individual restrictions for each vessel, while at the same time securing that the pressure upon 
the harvested resource does not increase. 
 
To illustrate the proposed framework we finally presented an empirical example. We used a 
dataset of 288 Danish fishing vessels to estimate each of the sectoral models. The analysis 
reveals that for the included vessels, gross profits may be increased by at least 50%. 
However, if fishermen are able to change their level of technical efficiency and output mix, 
the gains may increase by up to 90% compared to the current level. The resulting quota 
market was briefly characterized. The traded volume  – and hereby the amount of 
reallocations – increased considerably when the output mix was allowed to change. Also, the 
structural implications were explored. As one would expect after reallocations, the vessels 
were less specialized suggesting that economies of scope play a significant role, at least when 
the behavioral and technological flexibility increases. 
 
There are several relevant extensions of the research reported here. In particular, it may be 
useful to examine the impact of alternative restrictions on the changes in mix and efficiency 
that are allowed. We have taken a somewhat stylized approach and analyzed only four 
different and somewhat extreme specifications of the general penalty function.  
 
In the empirical example, we have either frozen the catch composition or we have allowed 
the vessels to alter their catch composition completely. The latter is an unlikely scenario in 
most fisheries - at least in the short run. It is unrealistic that a purse seiner, for example, that 
is highly specialized in catching pelagic species such as mackerel and herring can change to   32 
catch demersal species such as codfish. We have used the extreme assumptions to derive an 
interval of likely effects, but middle of the road assumptions could be introduced as well. As 
suggested by Korhonen and Syrjänen, this could, be done by allowing the output mix to 
change with only a certain percentage. Another approach would be to only allow vessels to 
change their output mix in accordance with the observed output mix of similar vessels. 
 
Alternative restrictions on the possible reallocations can also be derived from the design of 
the quota system. It may be too costly  – or politically unacceptable – to operate a quota 
system with free trade of all types of catch. The industry implications of alternative designs, 
however, can be analyzed along the same lines as the technological and behavioral 
restrictions. It is hereby possible to extend the approach of this paper to analyze the trade-off 
between political costs, transaction costs and industry profits.  
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